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The ability to pay for a government-led investment strategy to achieve the millennium 
development goals (MDGs) is determined by the resources available to the government 
through economic growth, taxation, loans, and grants. Unsustainable public debts 
increase poverty directly through negative impacts on economic growth as well as 
indirectly through cuts in spending. Hence, the issue of fiscal debt sustainability is critical 
for achieving the MDGs. In this paper, we use the debt projection module of SimSIP 
Debt to project the evolution of Bangladesh’s public debt over a 15-year horizon (from 
fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2021) under three different macroeconomic scenarios and 
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I.   Introduction 
As Figure 1 shows, at the end of 1993, Bangladesh’s total public debt amounted to 725 
billion taka. Six years later, at the end of 1999, it just surpassed the 1 trillion level; and at 
the end of 2006, Bangladesh’s total public debt amounted to nearly 2 trillion taka (about 
US$32 billion, see Figure 2).
1 This increase in public debt levels has worried many 






                                                 
1 Unless otherwise stated, all data has been taken from three IMF Country Reports and/or their 
corresponding Statistical Annexes for Bangladesh; see IMF (1998), (IMF (2003), and IMF (2007). Fiscal 
data refers as reported in IMF Country Reports to central government operations, which excludes grants 
that are provided directly to sectoral ministries as well as some debt to public corporations. Years are 




However, as Figure 3 shows, Bangladesh’s public debt has actually decreased in terms of 
gross domestic product (GDP), from 58 percent in 1993 to 46.7 percent in 2006 
(including a temporary and limited increase from 1998 to 2002).  
 
 
   
 
Nonetheless, there is a clear divergence in trends between external public debt and 
domestic public debt, both as percentages of GDP, with external public debt showing an 
overall decreasing trend, while domestic public debt has been increasing from 1993 to 
2002 (reaching a maximum 18.7 percent of GDP) and stabilized at around 18 percent of 
GDP since 2002. The overall decline in total public debt to GDP is due to the fact that the 
mostly decrease in external public debt to GDP has more than compensated for the initial 
increase and recent stability in domestic public debt to GDP. 
 
A similar picture evolves if expressing Bangladesh’s total public debt in terms of 
government revenues. As Figure 4 shows, Bangladesh’s external public debt has 
decreased from 527 percent of government revenues in 1993 to 267 percent of 
government revenues in 2006. Bangladesh’s domestic public debt has increased from 111 
percent of government revenues in 1993 to 192 percent in 2001 and decreased slightly to 
171 percent of government revenues in 2006. This resulted in an overall decrease in total 
public debt from 638 percent of government revenues in 1993 to 438 percent of 
government revenues in 2006 (though with a temporary increase from 1998-2000). 
 





As Figure 5 shows, the substitution of external borrowing with domestic borrowing 
started in the early 1990s. In 1993, domestic financing amounted to less than 5 percent of 
the government’s budget deficit, while external financing amounted to more than 95 
percent. The share of domestic financing of the budget deficit increased to over 60 
percent in 2001, after which it displays some volatility, though reaching a record high of 
64 percent in 2006. 
 
 
   4 
 
 
The fiscal burden of the relatively sharp increase in domestic public debt is clearly visible 
in Figure 6, showing the evolution of interest rate payments on external and domestic 




While Bangladesh’s public debt seems to be sustainable based on the trends shown in 
Figures 3 and 4, its fiscal burden is limiting Bangladesh’s ability to pay for social 
spending programs to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), especially if 
keeping in mind that additional investments needed to achieve the MDGs in Bangladesh 
are estimated to amount to about US$8 billion per year.
2 Indeed, in 2006, the Bangladeshi 
government paid 2.8 percent of its revenues as interest payments on its external debt 
while it paid 14.1 percent of its revenues as interest on its domestic public debt. Including 
due principal repayments, Bangladesh’s annual debt service payments amount currently 
to nearly 100 percent of government revenues. The government is only able to pay this 
large debt service by rolling over the due principal repayments in terms of new 
borrowing, especially domestic borrowing. 
 
As Figure 7 shows, expenditures of the Bangladeshi government remained relatively 
stable at about 14 percent of GDP, while government revenues show an overall 
increasing trend, especially after the temporary decrease in 1999 and 2000. With 
government expenditures to GDP levels relatively stable, changes in government deficits 
reflected thus far mostly changes in government revenues. However, even if government 
revenues would continue to increase and non-essential expenditures would be cut 
                                                 
2 Based on the calculations of the United Nations (UN) Millennium Project (2005), average investments 
needed per person over a ten-year period (2006-2015) to meet the MDGs amount to US$1047, of which 
current spending (including grants and loans) cover less than half, leaving a MDG financing gap of US$587 
over a ten year period, or about US$59 per year and per person. Hence, additional investments needed per 
year to achieve the MDGs in Bangladesh would amount to about US$8 billion, which is nearly 7 times the 
aid level Bangladesh currently receives (US$1.2 in 2006). It should be stressed that the funds for such a 
nearly 7 times increase in aid levels to Bangladesh as well as for similar increases to other needy countries 
would be easily available if the international donor community would make good on the long-standing goal 
of providing 0.7 percent of gross national income (GNI) as aid.   5 
 
 
drastically, given that the needed additional expenditures to reach the MDGs in 
Bangladesh (US$8 billion) amount to about 12 percent of the 2006 GDP level, the 
government led investment strategy to achieve the MDGs could not be financed without 




Following the considerable amount of debt relief that has been provided to about half of 
the so-called least developed countries (LDCs) under recent international debt relief 
initiatives,
3 Bangladesh has today one of the highest public debt levels among LDCs, 
especially if expressed in terms of government revenues. As has been detailed by Gunter 
(2002, 2003, and 2007) and UNCTAD (2004), the main source for this outcome is due to 
the fact that domestic public debt is not taken into account when determining a country’s 
qualification for recent debt relief initiatives. Bangladesh’s public debt levels are lower 
than those of most other South Asian countries (e.g. that of India), Bangladesh’s 
economy is also far more vulnerable to shocks and therefore far less able to sustain 
higher debt levels. 
 
This paper analyzes the sustainability of Bangladesh’s public debt under alternative 
assumptions and financing scenarios. In order to better assess Bangladesh’s debt 
sustainability, we make use of SimSIP Debt, a debt projection module developed by 
Gunter, Lopez, Ramadas and Wodon (2002).
4 This debt projection module is used to 
simulate the evolution of Bangladesh’s public debt over a 15-year horizon, based on 
initial conditions and projections for government expenditures, government revenues, and 
other parameters. Given that Bangladesh’s external debt is mostly concessional, this 
                                                 
3 These include the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative, post-HIPC Paris Club debt relief, and 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), whereby the MDRI has been based on the human development 
approach to debt sustainability as it provided 100% debt relief on certain debts of MDRI eligible countries. 
4 The SimSIP Debt Simulator and its Manual are available free of costs on the World Bank’s SimSIP 
website: http://www.worldbank.org/simsip.   6 
 
 
analysis looks at the level and trends of net present value (NPV) debt sustainability 
indicators and (nominal) debt service to government ratios.
5 
 
The next section (Section II), presents some approaches, concepts, and examples for 
analyzing debt sustainability (Section II.1-II.3) as well as the theoretical background for 
the debt projection module of SimSIP Debt (II.4). The third section (Section III) then 
simulates the evolution of Bangladesh’s public debt for three alternative macroeconomic 
scenarios while keeping the share of priority spending to GDP fixed for all three 
scenarios. Section IV goes one step further by simulating the evolution of Bangladesh’s 
public debt for two different financing scenarios of an ambitious government-led 
investment strategy, for example to achieve the MDGs. While most assumptions (and the 
results that depend on them) are for illustrative purposes, they do imply policy 
implications for the government as well as the donor community, which are then 
summarized in the last section of the paper (Section V). 
 
II.   The Theory of Analyzing Debt Sustainability 
A common definition of debt sustainability is whether a country can meet its current and 
future debt service obligations in full, without recourse to debt relief, rescheduling, or 
accumulation of arrears. However, to determine if a country’s debt is sustainable or not is 
a complex issue and there are a variety of approaches of how to analyze debt 
sustainability. The theoretically most appealing approach is to derive debt sustainability 
criteria based on discounting the net present value of the government’s debt over an 
infinite horizon. However, the limitations of this approach has led to the development of 
more practical debt sustainability indicators that are usually based on a ratio of a debt 
variable to another key macroeconomic variable. Another approach is to look at the 
consistency of the government’s budget deficit with the government’s desired level of 
indebtedness; see Gunter, Lopez, Ramadas and Wodon (2002) for more details. 
 
II.1.   External versus Fiscal Sustainability 
In addition to the different approaches, there are two main criteria to assess debt 
sustainability: one criterion is to look at the external sustainability of a country’s debt; the 
other criterion is to look at the fiscal sustainability of a country’s debt. The external 
criterion is supposed to compare a country’s external debt or debt service to a country’s 
exports. The fiscal criterion compares a country’s public and publicly guaranteed debt or 
debt service to government revenues. While the results based on these two categories of 
debt sustainability criteria yield many times to similar results, external sustainability is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for fiscal sustainability and vice versa.
  
 
II.2.   Nominal Stock of Debt versus Net Present Value of Future Debt Service 
Excluding debt sustainability indicators that compare current debt service obligations to 
some macroeconomic variables (e.g., the debt service-to-export ratio), there are two main 
                                                 
5 Bangladesh’s debt sustainability has recently also been analyzed by Islam (2007) and Islam and Biswas 
(2006). Their analyses differ considerably to our analysis as they use the nominal debt sustainability 
concept, assess debt sustainability based on changes and differentials, and are only backward-looking 
(covering data up to fiscal year 2007).   7 
 
 
concepts of defining debt sustainability indicators. The more traditional concept 
compares the nominal stock of disbursed and outstanding debt to some macroeconomic 
variables. The more sophisticated concept calculates first the NPV of all future debt 
service on disbursed and outstanding debt and compares then the NPV debt to some 
macroeconomic variable (like GDP, exports, and/or government revenues). As shown in 
Gunter (2001), the debt-to-government ratio is the most relevant indicator for the 
determination of a debt overhang. The NPV calculation sums up all future debt service 
obligations, whereby future debt service obligations are discounted depending on when 
the debt service is due. This is especially important if a country has a lot of concessional 
debt. 
 
There are many options of how to determine discount rates, and depending on user 
preferences, distinctions can be made in terms of  
•  the currency in which future debt service is payable  
(e.g., the discount rate for the US Dollar or the British Pound), 
•  the kind of reference rate to use for the discount rate 
(e.g., the lending rate or the borrowing rate),  
•  the time-period for the discount rate 
(e.g., the short-term or long-term lending rate), and  
•  the period over which the discount rate is averaged 
(e.g., over the last 6 months or the last 10 years). 
 
Due to practical and theoretical limitations of using a complex definition of short-term 
discount rates to determinate long-term debt sustainability, the SimSIP Debt’s Debt 
Projection Module uses only one discount rate, which is however flexible over time.
6 
 
II.3.  Examples of Debt Sustainability Indicators 
The debt indicator approach defines debt by a variety of macroeconomic debt 
sustainability indicators. The following are some examples of debt sustainability 
indicators as they are used in a) the World Bank’s Global Development Finance (GDF), 
b) the HIPC Initiative, c) target 15 of the MDGs, and d) the European Union’s (EU) 
Maastricht Treaty. 
 
The World Bank’s Global Development Finance (GDF, formerly World Debt Tables) 
classifies external indebtedness based on two ratios, the ratio of the NPV of total external 
debt (calculated based on all future debt service) to the three-year backward looking 
average of gross national product (GNP), and the ratio of the NPV of total external debt 
(calculated based on all future debt service) to the three-year backward looking average 
of exports of goods and services (including workers’ remittances). If either ratio exceeds 
a critical value—80 percent for the NPV debt to GNP ratio and 220 percent for the NPV 
                                                 
6 As is illustrated in more details in Gunter (2002), there is no definitive correct or wrong concept of how to 
define discount rates, however, it is generally preferred to use long-term average discount rates in order to 
avoid changes in the resulting NPV calculations that are due to marginal and arbitrary changes in discount 
rates.   8 
 
 
debt to exports ratio—the country is classified as severely indebted. If the critical value is 
not exceeded but either ratio is three-fifths or more of the critical value (that is, 48 
percent for the present value of debt service to GNP and 132 percent for the present value 
of debt service to exports), the country is classified as moderately indebted. If both ratios 
are less than three-fifths of the critical value, the country is classified as less indebted.
7 
 
In the framework of the HIPC Initiative, a country is considered to have a sustainable 
external debt if the ratio of the present value external debt (calculated based on all future 
debt service) to the three-year backward looking average of exports of goods and non-
factor services (excluding workers’ remittances) is smaller or equal to 150 percent. 
However, given to the limitations of the export criterion, especially for countries with a 
high export to GDP ratio, the HIPC Initiative added a fiscal criterion of debt 
sustainability for countries that have an export to GDP ratio of at least 30 percent and a 
government revenue to GDP ratio of at least 15 percent. For HIPCs satisfying both of 
these thresholds, the HIPC Initiative considers an additional fiscal criterion: a HIPC’s 
external debt is sustainable if the ratio of the present value of public and publicly 
guaranteed external debt to government revenues is smaller or equal to 250 percent. 
 
Within the set of MDGs, target 15 is defined as to deal comprehensively with the debt 
problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to 
make debt sustainable in the long-term. The four indicators for this target are (a) the 
proportion of official bilateral HIPC debt cancelled, (b) the debt service as a percentage 
of exports of goods and services, (c) the proportion of official development assistance 




The European Union’s (EU) Maastricht Treaty (signed in early 1992) limited the ratio of 
government debt to GDP to 60 percent, though it was also agreed that higher ratios are 
acceptable as long as the debt to GDP ratio is sufficiently falling over time. Indeed, most 
countries of the EU had debt to GDP ratios above 60 percent for most of the times during 
the 1990s, and at least three countries (Belgium, Greece, and Italy) had debt to GDP 
ratios of more than 100 percent. Anyway, it should be stressed that the Maastricht 
Treaty’s debt to GDP ratio should not be interpreted as debt sustainability indicator, but 
as convergence criteria set by a group of European countries that intended to adopt a 
single currency by the end of 2001. 
 
The three most commonly used macroeconomic variables used as a denominator of a 
debt ratio or a debt service ratio are (a) gross domestic/national product (GDP/GNP), (b) 
exports, and (c) government revenues. There are some options on how to define each of 
these three macroeconomic variables. For example, exports could (a) in- or exclude 
worker’s remittances, (b) in- or exclude re-exports (exports that simply pass through the 
country), and (c) be based on current-year values or multi-year averages. 
 
                                                 
7 Please see http://www.worldbank.org/prospects/gdf2002/ for more detailed information. 
8 Please see http://www.undp.org/mdg/ for further information.   9 
 
 
Reflecting the fact that for a broad group of countries debt sustainability cannot be 
determined by one specific indicator, the debt projection module adopts a flexible 
approach to debt sustainability, which provides the user with various options on how to 
define debt sustainability. 
 
II.4.  Theoretical Foundation of the Debt Projection Module 
The Debt Projection Module calculates the values for various debt indicators based on 
three modeling elements: the modeling of government expenditures, the modeling of 
government revenues, and the specification of the government deficit, which is financed 
by new borrowing after deducting grants and debt relief. Both, expenditures and revenues 
are influenced by the level of gross domestic product (Y), which is determined by the 
previous year’s level [Y(t-1)], the projected growth rate for the year (g), and the inflation 
rate (π):  
Y(t) = (1+π(t)) * (1+g(t)) * Y(t-1)      (1) 
 
On the expenditure side, the module differentiates between interest payments on public 
foreign debt, interest payments on public domestic debt, principal repayments on foreign 
and domestic debt, and other government expenditures. The average interest rates (not the 
interest payments) on outstanding foreign and domestic debts are exogenously fixed for 
any given year due to loan contracts, though the module differentiates between interest 
rates on public domestic and foreign debt. Given that new loans (due to principal 
repayments and deficit financing) are generally a small fraction of the debt stock, interest 
rates on domestic and foreign debts change only slowly over time. For simplicity, 
principal repayments are financed by new loans, though not necessarily from the same 
source (domestic or foreign) and at the same interest rate and maturity. All other 
expenditures (all expenditures excluding interest and principal payments) are a 
predetermined percentage of GDP, though this percentage rate may change over time. If 
we denote the interest rates on domestic and foreign debt by if and id (averages for the 
various loan contracts), the stocks of debt by Df(t-1) and Dd(t-1), and the exchange rate 
by  E(t), we have three kind of expenditures:  interest payments on foreign government 
debt [if(t-1)*Df(t-1)*E(t)]; interest payments on domestic government debt [id(t-1)*Dd(t-
1)]; and government expenditures on social and non-social sectors [Gsec(t)] = α(t)*Y(t).  
Total government spending is: 
 
G(t)  =   if(t-1)*Df(t-1)*E(t)  +  id(t-1)*Dd(t-1)  +  α(t)*Y(t)    (2) 
On the revenue side, we simplify the analysis by combining tax-, seignorage- and all 
other non-tax revenues to one percentage share [β(t)] of GDP. Changes over time in this 
percentage share reflect changes in tax rates, the efficiency of revenue collection, and 
money-financing,
9. The simulator calculates the intermediate values based on a linear 
trend. Grants [N(t)] and debt service relief [DSR(t)] are exogenously determined by 
foreign donors. Like foreign borrowing, grants and debt service relief are converted into 
domestic currency at the end of each period. If revenues before grants and before debt 
relief are denoted by REVbef(t) = β(t)*Y(t), revenues with grants and debt relief are: 
                                                 
9 To avoid negative implications of increased money-financing on growth, money-financing is usually 




REVaft(t) = β(t)*Y(t) + E(t)*N(t) + E(t)*DSR(t).         (3) 
 
Budget deficits [BD(t)] are simply the difference between total revenues (including 
grants and debt relief) and total government expenditures: 
BD(t)   =   G(t)  - REVaft( t )       ( 4 )  
 
The module assumes that the government faces no constraints in financing expenditures 
through new borrowing, and the user is free to choose what share of the new debt comes 
from domestic sources. If new domestic and foreign borrowing by the government are 
denoted respectively by BDd(t) and BDf(t), the change in debt is: 
 
BD(t)   =   E(t)*BDf(t) +  BDd(t)     (5) 
 
The simulator makes no assumptions for the impact of new borrowing on GDP growth, 
inflation, the exchange rate, and the level of loan concessionality
10.  While the 
assumptions for GDP growth, inflation, exchange rate depreciation, and average interest 
rates on domestic and foreign loans are all exogenous variables, the module allows to 
adjust the growth rate of real GDP downward, the inflation rate and the exchange rate 
depreciation upward, and the interest rates on domestic and foreign loans upward the 
higher the average ratio of government deficit to GDP is over the projection period. For 
countries with sustainable poverty reduction strategies in place, these considerations are 
less crucial since consultations with donors would reduce the existence of excessive 
financing gaps.  Combining (4) and (5) yields: 
G(t)  - REVaft(t)    = BD(t)  =  E(t)*BDf(t) +  BDd(t)    (6) 
 
The model is dynamic since the current year’s budget deficit is linked to the previous 
year’s budget deficit through the current year’s total government expenditures that 
include interest payments on previous year’s debt stock.  Once the level of debt is known 
over time, it is easy to compute the NPV of a country’s public foreign debt by using debt 
service projections based on the average interest rate and the average maturity of 
outstanding public foreign debt. For a country’s public domestic debt and a country’s 
private foreign debt, the NPV values are set equal to the nominal values. 
 
III.   Projections for Bangladesh’s Debt under Alternative Scenarios 
We simulate the evolution of Bangladesh’s public debt from 2006-2021, based on initial 
conditions and projections for government expenditures, government revenues, and some 
other parameters. Hence, we include all public debt (domestic and external) and exclude 
                                                 
10 In reality, increased borrowing tends to increase the growth rate of real GDP up to some critical level 
(which is difficult to determine), and consistently high government deficits tend to have negative impacts 
on real GDP growth and price stability. Depending on the country’s access to foreign concessional 
financing, the costs of new borrowing may also increase with a rising fiscal deficit. At low levels of fiscal 
deficits, the portion of concessional financing will be relative high. With rising financing gaps, more and 
more new loans will have increased interest rates.   11 
 
 
all private debt. Given that Bangladesh has considerable amounts of both concessional 
external and non-concessional domestic debts, we calculate the debt stock indicators in 
NPV terms. We first analyze Bangladesh’s fiscal public debt sustainability under three 
different macroeconomic scenarios and then simulate the sustainability of Bangladesh’s 
fiscal debt for two alternative financing scenarios of an ambitious government-led 
investment strategy to achieve the MDGs. 
 
III.1. Alternative  Macroeconomic  Scenarios 
The three alternative scenarios constitute (i) a baseline scenario based on historical 
values, (ii) a relatively arbitrary pessimistic scenario, and (iii) a relatively arbitrary 
optimistic scenario, whereby we always provide simulations for Bangladesh’s NPV 
public debt-to-GDP ratio, the NPV public debt-to-revenue ratio, and the public debt 
service-to-revenue ratio. The actual initial conditions for 2006 and the baseline 
macroeconomic scenario which is mostly based on an indicator’s historic averages 
(indicated by an “h” behind its numerical value) of 2002-06 are provided in Figure 8.
11  
 
Figure 8: Initial conditions and baseline macroeconomic scenario assumptions 
 
Grants Exports
Stock Int. Pay. 0 10,526 67.2
Initial Value 17,701 186 61,893 01 7 . 79 . 4
0 8.3 (h) 5.0 (h)
Discount Interest Inflation Real GDP Rev. to P.Spe.to
rate (%) rate (%) rate (%) growth (%) GDP(%) GDP(%)
Value (FY06) 5.0 1.05 7.2 6.6 10.7 12.1








Rate (T/$) Public Ext. Debt Nominal 
GDP Initial Value 
 
Public Dom. Interest on Public
Debt Domestic Debt
Initial Value 11,265 932
Share of Dom. Interest Discount Average
Financing (%) rate (%) rate (%) Maturity (years)
Value (FY06) 64 8.27 8.27 3
Value (FY21) 64 8.27 8.27 3
 
                                                 
11 All initial values as well as all values for t0 are based on actual data for 2006, except the discount rates, 
which are set at 5% for the external debt and equal to the public debt interest rate for the domestic debt in 
order to avoid any distortions in the NPV calculation. The values for t15 are either based on historical 
averages of 2002-2006 or set equal to the t0 values in cases where historical data is not easily available, 
except the primary spending to GDP ratio for 2021, which is consistent to the revenue to GDP ratio for 
2021 set 5 percentage points higher than the 2006 value. The increase in the revenue to GDP ratio reflects 
the historical trend of 2002-06, where the revenue to GDP ratio increased by about 1.6 percentage points, 




The parameter values for the pessimistic and optimistic scenarios are set relatively 
arbitrarily, though for illustrating different evolutions under economically consistent 
parameter choices. They are not based on any probability, predications or value 
judgment. The point is to have some comparisons to the baseline scenario, though the 
relative changes across indicators (see Table 1) are based on basic macroeconomic 
theory, that is, the pessimistic scenario shows lower GDP growth combined with lower 
export growth, higher inflation rates, a higher exchange rate depreciations, and lower 
shares in government revenues to GDP; and similarly, the optimistic scenario shows 
higher GDP growth combined with higher export growth, lower inflation rates, lower 









FY06 6.6 6.6 6.6
FY21 5.7 (h) 3.7 7.7
FY06 17.7 17.7 17.7
FY21 8.3 (h) 4 12
FY06 7.2 7.2 7.2
FY21 5.3 (h) 7.3 3.3
FY06 9.4 9.4 9.4
FY21 5.0 (h) 6 4
FY06 12.1 12.1 12.1
FY21 17.1 17.1 17.1
FY06 10.7 10.7 10.7
FY21 15.7 (h) 12.7 18.7




Share of priorty 
spending to 
GDP (%)
Share of gov. 
rev. to GDP (%)
Table 1: Alternative Assumptions Under Different 
Macroeconomic Scenarios
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The results for these three scenarios are graphically presented in Figure 9, showing the 
three different evolutions of the NPV debt-to-GDP ratios, the NPV debt-to-revenue 
ratios, and the debt service-to-revenue ratios for each of the three scenarios, clearly 
reflecting the baseline, pessimistic, and optimistic scenarios. The different results for 
each of the three fiscal debt sustainability indicators are due mostly to the change in the 
GDP growth rates and the change in the revenue to GDP ratios. The changes in inflation 
rates and depreciation rates influence the results only marginally. The change in export 
growth rates has due to the simplicity of the module no effect on these three indicators, 
though export growth rates would have a major impact on external debt sustainability 
indicators. 
 
IV. Debt  Sustainability  versus Development? 
This section analyzes the implications on debt sustainability of an ambitious government-
led investment strategy targeted at eliminating poverty, accelerating broad-based 
sustainable development, or preparing the country for the negative implications of 
climate change; in short, a strategy to reach all the MDGs. We use the MDG-costing as 
an approximation of the costs for such a strategy, which as mentioned above, has been 
put at US$8 billion per year. There obviously are many assumptions and uncertainties 
related to this figure, yet, we will use it for illustrative purposes and apply it over the 
whole 15-year projection period of the debt projection module as even with reaching the 
MDGs by 2015, half of Bangladesh’s poverty would remain and would need to be 
eradicated many years beyond 2015. 
 
In terms of government spending, the US$8 billion annual investment strategy would 
imply an initial increase in the share of the primary spending to GDP of about 13 
percentage points. With optimistic GDP growth rates of about 8 percent per annum and 
an initial GDP of about US$62 billion, the 13 percentage points increase in primary 
spending to GDP of 2006 would fall to a 5 percentage points increase in primary 
spending to GDP in 2021. Given that the share of primary spending to GDP amounted to 
12.1 percent of GDP in 2006, the share of primary spending including the investment 
strategy would slowly decrease from about 25 percent of GDP in 2006 to about 17.1 
percent of GDP at the end of the projection period (2021). This is also identical to the 
2021 value under the baseline scenario, which was chosen there to keep the difference 
between government revenues to GDP and primary expenditures to GDP fixed at 5 
percent for all years. 
 
IV.1. Alternative  Financing  Scenarios 
Given the limitations Bangladesh faces to raise revenues (or to cut other expenditures) to 
finance such an investment strategy (reflected in an accelerated increase in the percentage 
of revenues to GDP), most of these expenditures would initially be covered by loans and 
grants, whereby we consider two illustrative scenarios as follows: 
a)  the debt scenario assumes that the resulting financing gap in the government’s 
budget would be covered exclusively by debt financing (keeping the shares of 
external and domestic financing unchanged);   15 
 
 
b)  the grant scenario assumes that half (US$4 billion) of the annual costs would be 
covered by external grants provided by Bangladesh’s development partners, while 
the other half would be debt-financed (keeping the shares of external and 
domestic financing unchanged). 
 
While such an ambitious investment strategy would obviously affect all other 
macroeconomic parameters, we limit the parameter changes to GDP growth, inflation, 
interest rate, exchange rate depreciation, and the share of government revenues to GDP 
(see Table 2). These parameter changes are once again not based on any estimation, 
predication or value judgment, but simply chosen for illustrative purposes, though 









FY06 6.6 7.6 8.6
FY21 5.7 (h) 5.7 (h) 5.7 (h)
FY06 17.7 17.7 17.7
FY21 8.3 (h) 8.3 (h) 8.3 (h)
FY06 7.2 9.2 8.1
FY21 5.3 (h) 5.3 (h) 5.3 (h)
FY06 9.4 11.4 10.4
FY21 5 5 5
FY06 12.1 25.0 25.0
FY21 17.1 17.1 17.1
FY06 10.7 13.7 13.7
FY21 15.7 (h) 15.7 (h) 15.7 (h)
FY06 level 0 0 4,000
FY06 growth 0 0 0
FY21 growth 0 0 0
Share of gov. 
rev. to GDP (%)
Grants to the 
central gov.
Table 2: Alternative Financing Scenarios of a Government-led 
Investment Strategy to Achieve the MDGs
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The simulation results provided in Figure 10 show that Bangladesh would obviously 
experience a significant increase in debt levels, but that—at least for the parameters 
chosen—the debt ratios would start to fall (i) after about 10 years under the debt scenario, 
and (ii) after about 7 years under the grant scenario. The three graphs of Figure 10 also 
show that at the end of the projection period (2021), the debt ratios would remain 
considerably above the initial values under the debt scenario, while all three ratios would 
fall below their initial levels under the grant financing strategy. 
 
The simulations seem to indicate that some acceleration of Bangladesh’s development 
strategy might be considered as long as the increase in debt levels is clearly limited and 
temporary. The problem however is that Bangladesh’s initial debt values are already high 
for a least developed country and that there are no clear criteria for acceptable increases 
in debt levels. Empirical work by Kraay and Nehru (2006) has shown that debt distress 
levels are lower for countries that have better policies and institutions compared to 
countries that have worse policies and institutions, whereby the quality of policy and 
institutions has been determined by the World Bank’s country policy and institutional 
assessment (CPIA). While there remain doubts about the appropriateness and objectivity 
of the World Bank’s CPIA, there is broad agreement that better policies and better 
institutions lower the risk of a country to face debt distress. This broad agreement on the 
linkage between policies and debt distress has been operationalized in the joint World 
Bank–IMF debt sustainability framework (DSF) to determine country-specific debt-
burden thresholds, see IMF and IDA (2005). 
 
However, the Bank-Fund DSF makes no adjustments in a country’s borrowing 
constraints due to development achievements. In other words, the DSF does not reduce 
the tension between (a) debt-financing national development strategies to achieve the 
MDGs and (b) maintaining debt sustainability. Given this shortcoming, Gunter (2007) 
has suggested to adopt a new MDG-consistent debt sustainability concept, which would 
allow a country to increase its borrowing limits within certain limits as long as it makes 
progress with achieving the MDGs. The basic rationale behind the MDG-consistent debt 
sustainability is that progress made towards achieving the MDGs can be considered an 
asset for an economy, similar to the asset of having good policies and institutions.  
 
For example, a country that has achieved universal primary education is likely more debt 
sustainable than a country in which only 50 percent of children go to school. Hence, 
instead of linking borrowing limits to possibly biased assessments of a country’s policies 
and institutions, the linkage to MDG achievements would be more objective. 
Furthermore, while the exact adjustments in borrowing limits would need to be based on 
empirical verifications of what levels are indeed sustainable, the MDG-consistent debt 
sustainability concept would allow a country to increase its borrowing limits over time. 
The remainder of this section applies and illustrates the proposed MDG-consistent debt 
sustainability concept to Bangladesh. 
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IV.4.  Application of the MDG-Consistent Debt Sustainability Concept 
The MDG-consistent debt sustainability concept implies that an explicit adjustment is 
made in until now solely financial debt sustainability indicators, whereby the adjustment 
is to divide the debt indicators by an MDG-index, whereby the MDG-index takes 
progress made with achievements of certain MDG-targets into account.  
 
Taking data constraints as well as analytical constraints into account, the concrete index 
proposed is a composite of the following four MDG targets: 
•  Target 1: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income 
is less than one dollar a day (measured by its first indicator: proportion of 
population below $1 (1993 PPP) per day). 
•  Target 3: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be 
able to complete a full course of primary schooling (measured by its first 
indicator: net enrolment ratio in primary education). 
•  Target 5: Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality 
rate (measured by its first indicator: under-five mortality rate). 
•  Target 6. Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal 
mortality ratio (measured by its first indicator: maternal mortality ratio). 
 
While other MDGs and MDG-targets could be added, we have limited the calculation of 
the proposed MDG-index to these four targets as they strike some balance between 
(a) reflecting the core of MDGs with (b) analytical simplicity and data constraints. The 
calculation of each sub-index is then simply the percentage to which each target has been 
achieved. For example, if a country had achieved all four targets, each sub-index would 
be 100. If a country has not made any progress in any of the four targets, each sub-index 
would be 0. Hence, the overall MDG-index may be defined as follows: 
 
 
The first fixed addend of 1 has been put into the calculation formula to ensure that the 
MDG-index has a minimum of 1; the sum of the four elements reflecting the four MDG 
targets are divided by eight to ensure that the MDG-index has a maximum of 1.5. Hence, 
the MDG-index takes a value of 1 if a country has made zero progress in achieving the 
four MDG-targets; it takes a value of 1.5 if a country has fully achieved all four MDG-
targets. 
 
Using the available data on Bangladesh’s progress with achieving the MDGs
12 implies an 
MDG index for Bangladesh of currently 1.25 (see Gunter (2007) for details). Appling this 
MDG-index to the NPV debt to GDP ratio (shown in the top graph of Figure 10) would 
imply a reduction from 40 percent (in 2006) to 32 percent (in 2006). Instead of reducing 
                                                 
12 See the official UN site for the MDG indicators at http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx. 
MDG-index = 1 + (
Percentage 












of Target 6 
achieved/100
)/8  19 
 
 
the value from 40 percent to 32 percent, if Bangladesh would like to use the fiscal space 
that is provided by switching to an MDG-consistent debt sustainability concept, she could 
have accumulated new debt in the amount of US$9.9 billion in 2006.
13 Furthermore, 
assuming that Bangladesh would continue to make progress in achieving the MDGs and 
grow as assumed in the baseline scenario, she would be able to accumulate additional 
new concessional loans in the amount of about US$1.1 billion a year, while following the 
debt path of the baseline scenario, that is, reducing her MDG-consistent NPV debt to 
GDP ratio from 40 percent in 2006 to 35.7 percent in 2021. 
 
V.   Conclusions and Policy Implications 
We have reviewed the trends in Bangladesh’s public debt from 1993 to 2006, which are 
overall decreasing even though domestic public debt has increased from 111 percent of 
government revenues in 1993 to 192 percent in 2001. The overall trends also indicate that 
Bangladesh’s public debt is sustainable. However, three points need to be stressed: First, 
comparing Bangladesh’s current public debt levels with those of other low income 
countries, Bangladesh is actually one of the highest indebted countries in terms of both 
NPV debt to government revenues and public debt service to government revenues.
14 
Second, looking at the composition of Bangladesh’s public debt over time, the only 
reasons why Bangladesh did not qualify for HIPC debt relief are due to a) Bangladesh’s 
substitution of external debt with domestic debt (which started in the early 1990s), and b) 
the HIPC framework’s focus on external public debt sustainability. Third, given that there 
are no justifications for having excluded public debts from sustainability criteria, 
especially if linking the goal of debt sustainability with the goal of poverty reduction, and 
that recent debt relief initiatives have led to substantial reductions in the debt levels of an 
arbitrary subset of low income countries, the cancelation of Bangladesh’s external debt 
would be more than justified based on economic as well as equity considerations. 
 
We have used SimSIP’s debt projection module to simulate Bangladesh’s public debt 
sustainability under three different macroeconomic scenarios, reflecting a base line, 
pessimistic, and optimistic scenarios. More specifically, we have simulated the evolution 
of Bangladesh’s fiscal debt sustainability in terms of projections for three ratios:  (1) the 
NPV total public debt to GDP ratio, (2) the NPV total public debt to revenue ratio, and 
(3) the total public debt service to revenue ratios. Even though our projections were based 
on a set of different scenarios with a very limited number of parameter changes, various 
robustness checks have shown that additional parameter changes provide qualitatively 
similar results as long as the parameter changes are consistent with economic theory (that 
is, it would not make sense to assume that economic growth leads to a reduction in the 
                                                 
13 In addition to creating fiscal space by switching to an MDG-consistent debt sustainability concept, useful 
and complementary suggestions have also been put forward by Roy, Heuty and Letouzé (2006), 
concentrating on alternative fiscal policy rules that would foster an enabling reform for scaled up public 
investments that aim at allowing borrowing by governments for the sole purpose of financing net public 
investments. 
14 While the full extent of this will only become clear once the 2007 debt data (i.e., post MDRI) is 
available, the conclusion can already been drawn by comparing the ratios of external to domestic public 
debts of Bangladesh with those of the African HIPCs, see Table 10 of UNTAD (2004).    20 
 
 
share of government revenues to GDP). We are therefore able to draw the following 
policy implications from our simulations. 
 
First, while Bangladesh’ public debt is likely to remain sustainable over the next decade,  
economic shocks (may they be due to increased climate change-induced disasters and/or 
due to deteriorations in the world economy) can easily push Bangladesh on clearly 
unsustainable debt paths. Indeed, we should keep in mind that Bangladesh has 
experienced growth rates during the last few years that are unprecedented in its history, 
yet, we have used 2002-2006 for the projections of the baseline scenario. In other words, 
many observers would consider the baseline scenario to be a highly optimistic scenario. 
Indeed, taking shocks like climate change-induced disasters and possible social unrest 
due to rising food prices into account, our pessimistic scenario (with a sustained growth 
rate of close to 4 percent) could easily be the more realistic scenario than the baseline 
scenario, with leading to clearly accelerating and unsustainable public debt levels. Hence, 
the cancellation of Bangladesh’s external public debt would not only serve as a shock 
absorber but also allow Bangladesh to use its scarce resources to achieve the MDGs. 
 
Second, while Bangladesh may not face unsustainable debt levels in macroeconomic 
terms, if approaching debt sustainability from a human and social development 
perspective,
15 Bangladesh’s debt is not sustainable simply because Bangladesh has more 
urgent needs to reduce poverty than to make external debt service payments amounting 
even in the optimistic scenario to more than US$1.5 billion every year over the next 12 
years (2009-2021; see Figure 11). Indeed, given that total public debt service payments 
amount currently to nearly 100 percent of government revenues, it is clear that these debt 
service payments can only be made as old debt is replaced by new debt, i.e. principal as 
well as interest payments are mostly covered by new loans. 
 
Third, while the substitution of external financing with domestic financing made sense 
during the 1990s, the continuing substitution of external financing with domestic 
financing should be reversed to avoid a further increase in domestic interest payments 
relative to external interest payments (as it was shown in Figure 6). Clearly, domestic 
debt has the advantage of not carrying any currency risk, however, taking Bangladesh’s 
record in terms of maintaining macroeconomic stability into account, devaluations of the 
taka have been limited and do not appear to pose a risk for the sustainability  of 
Bangladesh’s external debt. On the other hand, domestic debt (on which the Bangladeshi 
                                                 
15 The human development approach to debt relief has originally been suggested by Northover, Joyner and 
Woodward at CAFOD in 1998.  It argues that most of the world’s poorest countries have an unsustainable 
debt as countries with a large proportion of their population living in absolute poverty have a more urgent 
need to spend their resources on poverty reduction than on debt service. Given the large amounts of 
resources needed to achieve the MDGs, the human development approach to debt sustainability is generally 
associated with the suggestion to forgive all remaining HIPC debt, see especially Sachs (2002). A detailed 
proposal along these lines has been made by Berlage, Cassimon, Dreze, and Reding (2004). Recognizing 
that primary needs of human development are not met in many poor developing countries and that the 
HIPC Initiative is not sufficient to resolve the debt overhang problem, they suggest a 15-year program that 
is targeted at implementing the MDGs while eliminating all of the outstanding debt for a set of 49 poor 
countries. As Berlage et al. point out, given that the concern for human development applies to all poor 
countries, heavily indebted or not, they suggest adding 7 non-HIPCs with a 1997 Human Development 
Index below 0.5: Bangladesh, Bhutan, Djibouti, Eritrea, Haiti, Nepal, and Nigeria.   21 
 
 
government spent 14.1 percent of its revenues just on the interest of the domestic debt) 
has the disadvantage of being non-concessional and also highly regressive in terms of 





Finally, we have used SimSIP’s debt projection module to simulate Bangladesh’s public 
debt sustainability under two different financing scenarios of an ambitious government 
led investment strategy: (i) the debt scenario (which assumed that the resulting financing 
gap in the government’s budget would be covered exclusively by debt financing) and the 
grant scenario (which assumed that half of the costs would be covered by external 
grants). While the results of the debt scenario imply increases in the debt levels for most 
of the projection period with levels high enough to have negative implications on 
investment and growth (which is not taken into account by the simulations), the grant 
scenario implies a clearly limited increase in debt levels, with reduced debt levels at the 
end of the projection period similar to those under the baseline scenario.  
 
Hence, the key question here is if temporarily higher debt levels can be justified to reduce 
poverty and to achieve the MDGs, and our recommendations here are threefold. First, 
considering that progress with achieving the MDGs increases a country’s ability to 
sustain higher debt levels, we consider the grant scenario to constitute a feasible option 
for Bangladesh. Second, adopting an acceptably defined MDG-consistent debt 
sustainability concept would be useful to reduce the tension between the goals of 
achieving the MDGs and achieving debt sustainability. Third, even if the annual US$8 
billion investment strategy is considered to be too ambitious and too risky for 
Bangladesh’s debt sustainability, Bangladesh’s record in terms of reducing poverty in the 
recent past justifies a rapid scale-up of aid to Bangladesh, and providing this scaled-up 
aid via grants would for sure be fully consistent with achieving long-term debt 
sustainability in Bangladesh. 
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